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Abstract
Subscription privacy of a user has been a historical concern with all the
previous generation mobile networks, namely, GSM, UMTS, and LTE. While
a little improvement have been achieved in securing the privacy of the
long-term identity of a subscriber, the so called IMSI catchers are still in
existence even in the LTE and advanced LTE networks. Proposals have been
published to tackle this problem in 5G based on pseudonyms, and different
public-key technologies. This paper looks into the problem of concealing
long-term identity of a subscriber and presents a protocol based on identity
based encryption (IBE) to tackle it. The proposed solution can be extended
to a mutual authentication and key agreement protocol between a serving
network (SN) and a user equipment (UE). We name the protocol PEFMA
(privacy enhanced fast mutual authentication). The SN does not need to
connect with the home network (HN) on every PEFMA run. In PEFMA,
both the user equipment (UE) and the SN has public keys. A UE sends
the IMSI after encrypting it using the SN’s public key. Since both the UE
and SN have public keys, PEFMA can run without contacting the HN.
A qualitative comparison of different techniques show that our solution is
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competitive for securing the long-term identity privacy of a user in the
5G network.
Keywords: 5G, Identity, IMSI, IBE, Privacy, Mutual Authentication, 3GPP.
1 Introduction
The NGMN Alliance has pointed out the privacy of a user as a requirement
of the 5G network [16]. When a user equipment (UE) tries to connect to
a network, the UE has to identify itself using an identifier. Once the UE is
identified, an authentication protocol is run between the UE and the network.
There are two types of attackers against the user privacy. A passive attacker
just listens to the radio communication and tries to figure out the identity of a
user. An active attacker may transmit some radio messages itself. It is easier
to protect against a passive attacker than an active attacker. Since 2G (GSM)
the network has used temporary identities to protect against passive attackers.
However, even in the LTE network the permanent identity is not protected
against active attackers.
We discuss solutions to conceal the long-term identifier known as inter-
national mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) during the identification phase.
These solutions are based on pseudonyms and public-key encryption. The
pseudonym based approaches require to maintain a synchronization of
pseudonyms between the UE and the HN. We discuss solutions based on
certificates and root-key for the category of public key. Public-key based
solutions do not require any synchronization. However, the public-key based
solutions have higher cost both in terms of communication and computation.
We propose a novel solution based on identity based encryption (IBE). One
additional advantage of our solution is that, it also works as a mutual authenti-
cation protocol between SN and UE without the involvement of the HN every
time the authentication is needed. This advantage can not be achieved using
root-key based approach. This advantage can be achieved using certificate
based approach, but it is the heaviest in terms of communication and compu-
tation. We evaluate our solutions based on the following criteria: (1) Immunity
to attackers, (2) Parts of the IMSI concealed, (3) Signaling overhead,
(4) Latency, (5) PKI complexity, (6) Public-key revocation, etc. The choice
of the solution depends on how much we want to achieve. Our solution
based on IBE becomes a competitive one by meeting most of the important
requirements.
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2 3GPP-defined Aspects of Mobile Networks
A subscription describes the commercial relationship between the subscriber
and the service provider, cf. 3GPP TR 21.905 [3]. A subscription identifier
uniquely identifies a subscription in the 3GPP system and is used to access
networks based on 3GPP specifications. Subscription privacy refers to the
right to protect any information that can be used to identify a subscription to
whom such information relates. This definition of privacy suggests to protect
any personally identifiable information (PII) from an attacker. While it may
be difficult to draw a clear boundary between PII and non-PII, the long-term
identifier is surely a PII.
2.1 System Overview
In the case of GSM, 3G (UMTS) and 4G (LTE) networks, IMSI is a long-term
identity of a subscriber. An IMSI is usually presented as a 15 digit number
but can be shorter. The first 3 digits are the mobile country code (MCC),
followed by the mobile network code (MNC), either 2 digits or 3 digits.
The length of the MNC depends on the value of the MCC. The remaining
digits are the mobile subscription identification number (MSIN) within the
network [4].
In order to present an easily comprehensible discussion, we need to
know what are the entities and communication interfaces are involved in this
identification process. We also need to know which entities can be entrusted
with the IMSI of a subscriber. As the architecture of 5G is yet to be finalized,
we present an abstraction of the involved entities and assume that whatever
the architecture of 5G will eventually be, it will contain something for each
of these entities and something for each of these interfaces. Figure 1 shows
Figure 1 High-level security architecture.
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the abstraction. The abstraction involves the UE, SN and HN. Note that in a
non-roaming situation, the SN and HN are the same network. There are two
more entities which are not part of the network but relevant in our discussion,
because they attack the network. They are passive IMSI catcher (PIC) and
active IMSI catcher (AIC).
The logical interface between UE and SN is initially unprotected. The
logical interface between SN and HN is protected. The PICs eavesdrop on
the UE-RAN interface when it is unprotected to extract an IMSI. The AICs
impersonate a legitimate SN and run a legitimate looking protocol with the
UE in order to find out the IMSI.
HN and UE both know the IMSI and they are trusted. Both of PIC
and AIC are untrusted. It is in principle possible not to trust SN. However,
by other specifications in 3GPP TS 33.106 [5] and TS 33.107 [6], it is
required to reveal IMSI to the SN to enable lawful interception (LI) without
involving HN.
2.2 Current Solution Approach and its Weakness
One approach of protecting IMSI privacy is to use a temporary identifier
instead of the actual IMSI and keep changing the temporary identifier fre-
quently. Note that the temporary identifier has to be assigned confidentially.
Different entities of the network may assign different temporary identifiers to
the UE.
In the LTE network, the temporary identifier assigned by an SN is called
globally unique temporary identity (GUTI) and the HN does not assign
any temporary identifier to the UE. However, during the initial attachment
of a UE to the SN, the UE has neither a GUTI nor a security context
with the SN that can assign it with a GUTI. Besides, GUTI can be lost
by either one or both of the UE and the SN. This would force the UE to
reveal its IMSI to the SN to keep itself from permanently locked out of the
network.
This problem gives an opportunity to an AIC who impersonates a legiti-
mate SN and forces the UE to run the initial attachment protocol. This also
gives an opportunity to a PIC to eavesdrop the IMSI sent in cleartext. Solutions
[12, 14, 17, 19] have been proposed by using temporary IMSI known as
pseudonym. While these solutions solve the cases of lost and unsynchronised
GUTI, they still have the problem of lost or unsynchronised pseudonyms.
Public-key technologies have also been considered as potential approach to
solve this problem.
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3 Discussion on Different Proposed Solutions
Before delving into different proposed solutions, let us introduce some
notation.
1. hnid, snid =MCC||MNC identifies the HN and SN respectively
2. eA, dA is the public and private key of entity A respectively
3. χA,B(eA, eB) is the certificate of the public key eA of A. The certificate
can be verified by anyone who considers B as a root CA using the public
key eB . The certificate is a guarantee from B that the public key eA is
owned by A.
4. E,D are encryption and decryption functions so that D(E(M,K),K) = M.
5. S(M,K) is the signature of message M signed by the key K
3.1 Solution Based on Pseudonyms
Pseudonym based solutions have been proposed in [12, 14, 17, 19]. In this kind
of solutions, temporary identifiers called pseudonyms are assigned to a UE.
Next time when the UE tries to identify itself to an SN, it uses a pseudonym
instead of IMSI. Periodically, whenever there is an opportunity, the HN sends
a new pseudonym to the UE with confidentiality and integrity protection.
One such opportunity could be when the HN sends the authentication vector
to an SN.
3.2 Solution Based on Certificate Based Public-key
Cryptography
Use of certificate based public-key encryption to conceal long-term identity
has been suggested in 3GPPTR 33.821 [7]. To use certificate based public-key
cryptography, we need to figure out who are the root CAs and who else can
be a CA, who own a public key, how a certificate can be revoked, and how
the UE can be re-provisioned with a new root certificate if needed. Different
solutions can be devised based on the choice of root CAs and other CAs. We
provide a high-level description for few variants of certificate based solution.
3.2.1 Variant 1
It uses a global root of trust. There is a global entity trusted by everyone. Using
this trusted global entity, a chain of trust can be established. The SN presents
the certificate to a UE trying to attach. The UE verifies the certificate. If the
verification result is positive, the UE encrypts its IMSI using the public key
of the SN and sends to the SN.
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3.2.2 Variant 2
In this variant the HN of a subscriber is the root CA. The HN generates a
public-private key pair and generates a certificate of the public key signed by
the HN itself. A UE is provisioned with this self signed certificate. An SN
interested to serve a UE obtains a certificate χsnid,hnid(esnid, ehnid). The UE
sends hnid, ehnid to the SN. The SN looks up for the certificate χsnid,hnid
(esnid, ehnid). In case it exists at the disposal of the SN, the SN sends it to the
UE. The UE verifies the certificate. If the certificate is verified as valid, then
the UE sends the IMSI to the SN encrypted by the public key esnid of the SN.
3.2.3 Variant 3
In this variant, there is no other CA than the root CA. Hence the chain of
certificates is very short. Only an HN can be a CA. The certificates of all the
SNs a UE might visit are pre-provisioned to the UE by the HN. When a UE
attempts to attach to an SN, the UE encrypts the IMSI with the public key of
the SN which is already provisioned to the UE. If the public key of an SN is
revoked, the HN has to provision the revocation to the UE.
3.3 Solution Based on Root-key Based Encryption
We use only one pair of public-private key pair in this approach. Such a
technique has been proposed in 3GPP TR 33.899 in solution #7.3. This key
pair is owned by the HN and we call it to be the root-key. The HN provisions
the public key to all its UEs. Instead of sending the IMSI, the UE encrypts the
IMSI with the public root key and sends the result to the SN along with the
hnid. The SN sends the encrypted IMSI to the HN. The HN decrypts the IMSI
and sends the IMSI back to the SN along with an authentication vector (AV).
3.4 Solution Based on IBE
In the next section we discuss the basic principles of IBE and present a solution
of the identity privacy using IBE.
4 Details of the IBE Based Solution
4.1 How IBE works
The idea of IBE was proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984 [18]. For last two
decades, there have been significant research effort in finding new IBE
schemes. For example, Dan Boneh and Matthew Franklin published a fully
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functional IBE scheme in 2003 [10] and Clifford Cocks presented an imple-
mentation in 2001 [11]. There are plenty of other schemes. There are also
a range of international standards e.g., ISO/IEC 11770-3, ISO/IEC 14888-2,
ISO/IEC 14888-3, IEEE P1363.3. In this paper we do not investigate into these
schemes and standards. Rather we investigate how a general IBE scheme can
be used to solve the identity privacy problem in the cellular networks. We
believe an appropriate standardized IBE scheme can be chosen later based on
other niche practical requirements of the networks. However, we present a
very simple description of how IBE works so that the readers can follow our
proposed solution easily.
The fundamental difference between IBE and certificate based public key
encryption is how the keys are generated and managed. In IBE, the public
key of a receiver is computed as a function of the identity of the receiver in
conjunction with the public key of a trusted third party. Similarly, the private
key of a receiver is computed as a function of the identity of the receiver in
conjunction with the private key of the trusted third party. Since the private
key of the trusted third party is known only by the trusted third party, no one
else than the trusted third party can compute the private key of a receiver. The
trusted third party will provision a receiver with the private key through some
other secured channel. Consequently, a sender does not need to authenticate
the public key of a receiver. In IBE, the authenticity of the public key of a
receiver is guaranteed by the trusted third party. Usually in IBE, the trusted
third party is known as the private key generator (PKG). Figure 2 shows the
mechanism.
Relevant constraints of an IBE scheme:
1. The private key of the receiver has to be provisioned to the receiver by
the PKG.
2. It is impossible to revoke the public key in IBE unless the identity itself
is revoked.
3. Since a PKG knows the private keys of all the receivers, a PKG can
decrypt any message sent by any sender to any receiver. This implies
that there must be a very high level of trust in the PKG.
4.2 Existing Proposals of Using IBE in Cellular Network
Jo, Paik and Lee proposed a privacy-preserving authentication protocol in
wireless mobile network in 2014 [13] based on a pseudo-identity-based sign-
cryption scheme. In this protocol the authors do not discuss how the public key
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Figure 2 How IBE works.
of the SNs can be revoked. This protocol is not designed for the 3GPP defined
cellular networks specifically but for any wireless mobile network. Naturally
there are 3GPP specific requirements that the protocol does not address at all,
e.g., the identity of a user is kept secret even from the SN which is not allowed
in 3GPP networks. In the rest of the paper we will refer this protocol as JPL
protocol.
Geir M. Køien proposed a privacy enhanced mutual authentication pro-
tocol in LTE in 2013 [15] based on IBE. The author named the proposed
protocol as PEMMA. In PEMMA, the HN is the PKG and the SNs own
public-private key pairs. In PEMMA the UE encrypts the IMSI using the
public key of the SN before sending the IMSI. Consequently PEMMA can
conceal the IMSI. However, the author designed PEMMA so that it requires
all the three parties (UE,SN and HN) to be online during the authentication.
Consequently PEMMA can not support the situation where the SN want to
use a pre-fetched AV. Also, in PEMMA, the authentication delay would most
likely be dominated by the physical distance between the SN and the HN when
they are in different continents. It would be desirable to have an authentication
protocol that can run even without contacting the HN when the HN is far from
the SN. Besides, PEMMA requires an SN to agree with all the HNs on the
same expiry date for its public key. It is not likely that a particular SN will be
trusted to the same extent by all the HNs.
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RFC 6508 [2] presents an algorithm SAKKE for establishment of a secret
shared value. Applications of SAKKE may include a date-time component in
their identity to ensure that identities and hence the corresponding private keys
are only valid for a fixed period of time. Solution #7.11 in 3GPP TR 33.899 [8]
uses IBE to protect the long-term identity according to RFC 6508. However,
the solution does not address the issue of revocation of the identity based
public keys. RFC 6507 [1] describes a certificate-less signature scheme based
on IBE. In this scheme a string called public validation token (PVT) randomly
chosen by the PKG is assigned to an identity. Both the public and private key
of a receiver are computed using the PVT along with the receiver’s identity.
So, the public key associated with an identity can be revoked by revoking the
PVT. Solution #2.14 in 3GPPTR 33.899 presents an authentication framework
based on the signature scheme of RFC 6507 and the authentication protocol
EAP-TLS. This solution uses the PVT to revoke the public key associated
with an identity. However, in this solution it is not clear how a UE can check
if the public key of an SN has been revoked or not.
4.3 Our Proposed Solution
Next we present a protocol that serves the purposes of both privacy protected
identification of UE and mutual authentication between UE and SN. This
mutual authentication does not require a contact with the HN each time the
protocol is run between a UE and an SN. Hence a fast mutual authentication
is achieved when SN and HN are located far from each other. We call this
protocol as privacy enhanced fast mutual authentication (PEFMA).
In PEFMA, the HN is the PKG. PEFMA does not use PVT but instead
use an expiry time (ET). This expiry time can act as the PVT. HN computes
private keys of all of its users using their IMSIs and suitably chosen ETs.
These private keys are provisioned to the UEs using a secured channel. The
SNs which have a roaming agreements with the HN are also provisioned with
their respective private keys by the HN. Before the expiration of the ET, a UE
or an SN may request for a new private key to the HN. The HN would choose
a new ET, compute the private key and send the new private key to the UE or
to the SN in a secure channel. A UE may request for a new private key if the
UE believes that the private key has been compromised.
PEFMA protocol may run when a UE is asked to reveal its IMSI. If a UE
identifies itself using a temporary identity and the SN can not recognize the
temporary identity, the SN asks the UE to reveal the IMSI. If the temporary
identity used by the user is recognized by the SN then the SN may run the
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PEFMA protocol if there is no appropriate pre-fetched AV available in the SN
and the HN is far from the SN. If the HN is near, the SN will fetch an AV and
run the traditional UMTS or LTE AKA. If there is already an appropriate pre-
fetched AV available, the SN runs the appropriate AKA protocol. Note than
an UMTS/LTE AKA will follow at some point after PEFMA is successfully
run. PEFMA is run to ensure fast authentication without contacting the
HN. The following AKA ensures that the user is not impersonating another
legitimate user by stealing the private key. The following AKA may run
at a point of time chosen by the SN. Figure 3 shows pictorially when
PEFMA is run.
If the public key of a user needs to be revoked, the expiry time along with
the identity of the user is added to the revocation list. If the user requires a new
public key (e.g., the old one is compromised), the PKG uses another expiry
time to compute the private key of the user. The newly computed private key
is then provisioned to the identity along with the the new expiry time. When
the expiry time comes, all the public keys computed using the expiry time
Figure 3 When to run PEFMA.
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Figure 4 PEFMA.
are automatically revoked. So, the revocation list does not need to include
revocations whose expiry time is in the past.
4.3.1 PEFMA
The UE’s HN acts as the PKG. The solution is pictorially presented in Figure 4.
The description follows:
1. The SN makes an IMSI Inquiry to the UE.
2. The UE computes esnid = g(ehnid, snid ||ET)
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3. The UE sends E(IMSI ||ETIMSI ||RAND1, esnid), hnid, hnkid, ET to the
SN. Here ETIMSI is the expiry time of the public-private key pair of
the UE. RAND1 is a random challenge chosen by the UE using a secure
random number generator function. hnkid is the key ID of the HN that
is used by the UE to compute esnid
4.0. The SN looks for a private key dsnid that is compatible with hnkid and
ET. If not found, it jumps to step 7, otherwise continues from step 4.
4.1. The SN extract IMSI, ETIMSI and RAND1 received in step 3. The SN
also computes the public key of the UE eIMSI using the public key of
the HN identified by hnkid as eIMSI = g(ehnid, IMSI ||ETIMSI ).
4.2. If the SN has a pre-fetched UMTS/LTE AV for IMSI then jump to
step 10.
5. The SN chooses a random challenge RAND2 using a secure random
number generator function. The SN encrypts both RAND1 and RAND2
using the public key of the UE computed in step 4.1. The SN also signs
the message IMSI ||RAND1||RAND2 using its private key dsnid and send
the signature to the UE so that the UE can verify it using the SN’s public
key.
6. The UE extracts RAND1 and RAND2 using its private key d IMSI . It ver-
ifies the signature received in step 5 using the public key esnid. If the ver-
ification is successful, the UE signs the message IMSI ||RAND1||RAND2
using its private key d IMSI . The SN verifies the signature using the
public key esnid. If this verification is successful then authentication is
completed and both the UE and SN are mutually authenticated to each
other. Based on RAND1 and RAND2 they can create shared secrets CK,
IK or KASME as required using key derivation functions.
7. If the SN does not have the appropriate private key to decrypt the message
it received in step 3, it forwards the received message to the HN. The SN
might not have the appropriate private key because the UE is using an
ET for which the SN has not been provisioned with a private key by the
HN. Another reason could be that the UE and SN are having different
public keys ehnid identified by different hnkid. The reason for having
different public keys ehnid could be that the HN has switched to a new
public-private key pair while either the UE or the SN is not yet aware of
the change.
8. Given snid, hnkid and ET, the HN can compute the appropriate dsnid.
The HN then extracts IMSI, ETIMSI and RAND1 using dsnid. The HN
then prepares an appropriate (UMTS/LTE) AV for the received IMSI.
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9. The HN forwards the IMSI, AV and the private key dsnid to the SN. The
SN stores the dsnid mapped with the respective hnkid and ET so that next
time a UE uses the same hnkid, ET, the SN would not need to contact
the HN.
10. The SN has an AV and based on the AV it sends an UMTS or an LTE
authentication request to the UE.
11. The UE sends the appropriate UMTS or LTE authentication response to
the SN.
4.4 Provisioning
The UEs and the SNs need to be provisioned with their respective private keys
and the HN’s public key. Keys will be expired and new keys will be needed
to be provisioned. Keys might be compromised and be needed to be revoked
(key revocation is discussed in next section). Once a key is revoked, a new
key is needed to be provisioned to the appropriate entities (either to UE or SN,
or both).
An SN is provisioned with the public key dhnid of an HN and with a key
ID hnkid first time when a roaming contract is signed between the SN and the
HN. When the public key of the HN expires or the private key be compromised
(an extremely rare event), the HN chooses a new public-private key pair. This
new public key along with the new hnkid is provisioned by the HN to all
the SNs who have a roaming contract with the HN. There is already a secure
channel between a HN and an SN, hence the keys can be provisioned with
both confidentiality and integrity protection. The HN also provisions all the
UEs who are in home and have a valid security context with the new public
key and the respective hnkid via the control plane. Messages in the control
plane are both confidentiality and integrity protected.
The SN does not request for a new private key even if the SN believes
that its private key has been compromised. Because there is no way to inform
the UE about it and consequently getting a new private key does not not help
in anyway. When the expiry time of the compromised private key comes, the
key is automatically expired. Hence, the expiry time of the public-private key
pairs of SNs’ is recommended to be near in the future.
We design our solution so that no change is required in the USIM. This
enables the legacy USIMs to work with our solution without any change.
This means, the public key of the HN and the private key of the UE have
to be provisioned to the ME. When a USIM is inserted into an ME, the ME
has no idea about the respective HN’s public key and the UE’s private key.
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So, for the very first time after a USIM is inserted in an ME, the UE identifies
itself with the IMSI. This is not a problem because this IMSI will not be
used anymore while the USIM is inside the same ME. Once authentication is
successful between the SN and the UE, there is a security context available.
If the UE is not roaming then the ME requests for key provisioning via the
control plane and the SN (which is also the HN) sends back the public key of
the HN along with the key ID and the private key of the UE along with the
ETIMSI also via the control plane. This message is both confidentiality and
integrity protected since it is exchanged via the control plane. Note that the
UE can not be provisioned with the keys when it is roaming.
If a UE believes that its private key has been compromised, and if the UE
is not roaming then it requests for new keys to the HN via the SN. HN revokes
the current key of the UE, chooses a new ETIMSI , compute the new private
key and send the new private key along with the chosen ETIMSI . The SN
forwards the same to the UE with both confidentiality and integrity protection
via the control plane.
The UEs also have to be provisioned with the list of all the trusted SNs and
if they are able to run PEFMA. Such provisioning can be done similarly as
the keys are provisioned via the conrol plane when there is a security context.
If a UE is offered service by an SN who is not in the trusted list and also does
not have PEFMA ability, the UE rejects the offer. If the SN is in the trusted
list but does not have PEFMA ability, the UE may accept the offer and reveal
the IMSI for authentication.
4.4.1 Key revocation
The ET used to generate the public key dsnid is quite near in the future, e.g.,
the day end. So, if the public key needs to be revoked, it would automatically
be revoked when the expiration time comes. In this way, a compromised SN
would be able mount an attack only for a short period of time. However, the
SN would need to get new dsnid from the HN before the old dsnid expires.
When the public key of a UE is revoked, the IMSI and relevant ET is
stored in a revocation list in the HN. An SN serving UEs of an HN has a copy
of the list. The SN also periodically checks with the HN if there is any new
revocations. Before computing the public key of the UE, the SN checks the
revocation list. If it is revoked, the SN discards the message received from the
UE and the authentication fails.
All the entries with expiry time older than current date-time can be removed
from the revocation list, hence the revocation list will not grow to a very large
size. This frequent private key exchange and refreshing the revocation list
would create a bit increased traffic between an SN and HN. On the other hand,
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this increased traffic is not in the air interface but in the back haul network,
which apparently is not very critical.
4.5 Discussion and Evaluation
4.5.1 Identity privacy
A PIC can learn the IMSI of a user during the first time the UE identifies itself
after the USIM is inserted into an ME. Moving USIM from one ME to another
is a very rare event and the PIC would have a very tiny chance in catching
an IMSI. However, a PIC learn the hnid of a subscriber who identifies itself
using the encrypted IMSI.
All a PIC can do, an AIC is also able to do. However, an AIC can still
impersonate a legitimate SN and present itself as not PEFMA enabled. The
UEs will be provisioned by the HN with the list of the PEFMA enabled SNs
it might visit. An PEFMA enabled UE will never reveal its IMSI to an SN
which is in the trusted list and marked as PEFMA enabled. Over the time as
more and more SNs become PEFMA enabled, the success rate of an AIC in
catching an IMSI decreases.
4.5.2 Impact of compromised/lost private keys
If the UE’s private key is compromised, the attacker who has the compromised
key can learn the IMSI and can impersonate the user by running PEFMA
protocol. The attacker can do this until the compromised key is revoked.
However, even before the revocation, when UMTS/LTE AKA is run, the
attacker would not be able to pass through and consequently be denied any
service. This means, using a compromised private key of a user, an attacker
can impersonate the user only until the compromised key is revoked and
only until the UMTS/LTE AKA is run. If the private key of the user is
lost but not compromised, the user can still identify itself using encrypted
IMSI but can not perform PEFMA which implies the user can not participate
in the fast authentication without involving the HN. Nevertheless, UE’s
compromised/lost private key can not keep it from authenticating itself to
the SN hence the user still remain connected with all the services. When
the user comes to the HN, a new private key can be provisioned to the
UE by the HN.
If an SN’s private key is compromised, an attacker who knows the
compromised key can impersonate the compromised SN to a UE, can run
PEFMA and consequently can breach the identity privacy, data confidentiality
and integrity. However, once the key expiry time comes the compromised key
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is automatically revoked and the attacker can not attack anymore thereafter.
However, compromisation of SN’s private key is an extremely rare event. Even
if it happens, the attacker can not keep attacking for long since the expiration
time of SN’s private-public key pair is near in the future. If SN’s private key
is lost but not compromised, the SN can not identify any user of the respective
HN and hence can not provide any service until the SN get private key from
the HN. However, losing the private key is also an extremely rare event. Even
if it happens, the SN knows it immediately a user from the respective HN
visits. This means, the SN can be quickly re-provisioned with the private keys
by the HN.
If the HN’s private key is compromised, the attacker who has the compro-
mised key can impersonate itself as any SN who has a roaming contract with
the HN. The attacker can then run PEFMA with any subscriber of the HN and
consequently can breach identity privacy, data confidentiality and integrity.
The attacker can also impersonate as a subscriber with an IMSI which belongs
to the HN and consequently can avail services. However, compromisation of
HN’s private key is an extremely rate event. Even if it happens, once the
compromisation is detected, the HN can generate a new public-private key
pair and re-provision all the SNs and UEs with a new public key.
If the HN’s public key is lost, no UE and SN can be provisioned with
private keys any more. This implies that after the expiration of the private key
of an SN, the SN would not be able to identify a user who tries to identify
itself using the encrypted IMSI. The HN chooses a new public private key
pairs and provisions the new public key to all the SNs and all the UEs who
are already assigned a TMSI or GUIT and currently not roaming. However,
all the UEs who are roaming or are not assigned a TMSI or GUTI remains out
of the network until it manually get the new public key of the HN.
4.5.3 Deployment complexity and efficiency
PEFMA is effective when both the UE and the SN are PEFMA enabled.
However, when an SN is not PEFMAenabled and in the trusted list, an attacker
can mount an active IMSI catching attack. Nevertheless, over the time more
and more SNs become PEFMAenabled and IMSI privacy enhances. It is better
than some other approaches that need a hard cut off date for implementing the
solution. PEFMA is also transparent to the USIM. Patching the legacy MEs
will be the challenge. There are still many 2G networks widely deployed across
the world. Both 3G and 4G networks are expected to exist few more decades.
PEFMA has to be explicitly patched into these widely implemented legacy
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networks. On the other hand, the 5G MEs can be patched with PEFMA ability
before making them available in the market. Thus, a user switching to a 5G
enabled ME avail PEFMA ability even for UMTS or LTE network.
Unlike PEMMA [15], PEFMA does not require to standardize the ET
(expiry time of the key of an SN) so that all the HN assigns the same ET to
a particular SN. Instead, in PEFMA, all the UEs of a particular HN uses the
same ET when they go roaming. This means an SN will need a private key
associated with the HN and the ET used by the UEs of the HN. In this way,
ET needs to be standardized only within a single HN, not across all the HNs.
PEFMA will introduce some extra signaling and computational overhead
between UE and SN due to public key encryption and introduction of new
message flows. However, PEFMA will run very infrequently and hence the
additional signaling overhead may not be much of a problem. Private keys
of SNs would need to be frequently provisioned by the HN. Generating
private keys frequently would add some additional computational load on
HSS. However, HSS is a very powerful server and should be able to serve the
extra load.
One usability issue is that, a user can not move its USIM from one ME to
another while roaming. If does so, the new ME can not be provisioned with the
HN’s public key and the users private key and hence the users IMSI privacy
will become vulnerable to an AIC until the user goes back to the HN.
5 Qualitative Comparison of Different Solutions
In this paper we have discussed two different categories of solutions:
pseudonym based and public-key based. Different solutions [12, 14, 17, 19]
have been and more could be devised based on pseudonyms.All these solutions
would require the UE and the HN to synchronize their pseudonym states
between a UE and the HN.
We have categorized the different public-key technologies into three
categories: certificate based, root-key based and identity based. None of them
require to maintain synchronization of states between a UE and the HN.
But these solutions have some downsides. They need comparatively heavier
computational resources, and the ciphertext are longer which affect the latency.
All these Solutions require a mechanism of key revocation.
In certificate based solutions there is a need of a global PKI. However, in
some variants of certificate based solutions, the effort to manage a PKI can be
reduced significantly. Certificate based solutions require an extra round trip
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between the UE and SN to exchange and verify the certificate. In a variant
of a certificate based solution, this extra round trip could be removed at the
expense of provisioning the certificate of an SN to a UE before the UE goes
roaming to the SN. All the certificate based solutions have the requirement
of exchanging certificates and verifying them. This creates signaling and
computational overhead which consequently affect the latency.
The root-key based solution does not require any extra round trips or cer-
tificates, hence it has better signaling and computational overhead compared
to certificate based. However, it still suffers from the increased latency in a
roaming situation because every authentication needs to travel all the way to
the HN. This is because no one else except the HN can decrypt the message
sent by the UE. The solution creates also computational pressure in the HN.
In the category of identity based solutions, the JPL scheme was not
designed specifically for the 3GPP defined networks and hence does not
support an important 3GPP requirement: LI. It also does not support the
revocation of the private keys of the SNs. PEMMA needs all the three parties
(UE,SN and HN) to be online which implies higher latency. PEMMA also
requires high standardization effort to revoke the public private key pairs of
the SNs.
Our novel solution based on IBE that we call PEFMA, can both accomplish
the identification and mutual authentication. The solution does not need to
maintain synchronized states between a UE and the HN. The solution does not
require a global PKI and does not need certificates. Unlike the root-key based
approach, our solution does not need to involve HN each time authentication is
needed. It requires standardization effort only within a single HN. The solution
can co-exist with the existing protocols and does not need a hard cut off
date for implementation. The aforementioned argument makes the IBE based
solution a potential candidate to solve the problem in question. In Table 1,
we present a comparison among the different solutions based on different
criteria.
Apparently pseudonym based solution is very good in most of the criteria.
One downside of pseudonym based approach is, if the pseudonym is unsyn-
chronized between UE and HN, the user has to visit the HN physically and get
back to synchronized state by giving the IMSI in a trusted environment. The
need of visiting the HN physically might make the pseudonym based solution
a little clumsy. Variant 1 of certificate based approach is good in preventing
AIC and also conceals hnid. But this is bad in many other important criteria
because of exchanging and verifying certificates. Considering the concealment
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Table 1 Comparative evaluation of the solutions
Public-key based Solutions
Certificate based IBE based
Criteria Pseudonym V1 V2 V3 Root-key JPL PEMMA PEFMA
Immunity to AIC + + + + + + + +
Concealing hnid – + – – – + – –
Lawful interception + + + + – – + +
Mutual Authentication – + + + – + – +
Signaling overhead + + – – – + + + +
Computational overhead + – – – + + + +
Latency while roaming – – – – – + – +
Latency while at home + + – – – + + + +
PKI effort + + – + + + + + +
Key revocation ++ – – – + – – –
Provisioning effort + + + – + + + +
Using existing gear + – + + + – + +
Maturity – + + – + – – –
of hnid with a bit less priority, the CertV1 is outperformed by both root-key
based and IBE based solution. CertV2 and CertV3 can not even conceal hnid.
So, the extra overhead of using CertV2 and CertV3 is not worth comparing
to root-key, PEMMA or PEFMA. When comparing PEMMA, PEFMA and
root-key, all of them are almost similar except that PEFMA provides mutual
authentication between the UE and the SN. However, CertV1 can also be
extended to such a mutual authentication protocol.
If concealing hnid is essential, then the only applicable solution is CertV1,
the certificate based solution with global root of trust. If concealment of
hnid can be compromised, then the choice of the solution depends on the
requirement of mutual authentication. If mutual authentication of UE and SN
without involving HN is considered important and useful then PEFMA is the
winner. Otherwise, root-key based solution is just enough.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed different known approaches to conceal the
IMSI. The solutions are based on pseudonyms and public-key encryption.
We have proposed a novel solution based on identity based encryption that
serves the purposes of both identification and mutual authentication. We have
used expiry time as part of the identity of the entities in the system. We have
presented a qualitative comparison between different solutions. We argue that
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identity based encryption is a competitive solution when concealing the home
network identity is not necessary and mutual authentication between a user
equipment and a serving network is useful without connecting with the home
network. The comparison is based on qualitative analysis based on known
facts of public-key cryptography.
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